Few conclusions about economic events have been repeated as frequently or have had as much influence on economists' attitudes toward monetary policy as the assertion that the monetary system of the thirties was "caught in a liquidity trap." Empirical studies of the public's demand for money and the banks' demand for earning assets seemed to support the assertion about a trap and the closely related conclusion that monetary policy had no effect on output, employment, and prices during at least some part of the thirties.
Few conclusions about economic events have been repeated as frequently or have had as much influence on economists' attitudes toward monetary policy as the assertion that the monetary system of the thirties was "caught in a liquidity trap." Empirical studies of the public's demand for money and the banks' demand for earning assets seemed to support the assertion about a trap and the closely related conclusion that monetary policy had no effect on output, employment, and prices during at least some part of the thirties.
1 Conclusions about the occurrence of a trap and the ineffectiveness of monetary policy were reinforced by central bankers' statements that likened monetary policy to "pushing on a string."
2 Taken together the empirical evidence and the central bankers' interpretations convinced many economists that some form of a trap had existed (Keynes 1936 p. 207; Fellner, 1948, pp. 81-83, 91-93; Villard, 1948 , pp. 324 334 345-Shaw, 1950 . 3 There are a number of reasons for re-examining these conclusions and reopening the discussion of liquidity traps. First, recent empirical studies •ive imerpretation of S T'"'" ^ ™ ^ 1964a, 19646; Brunner, 1965 
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In this paper, we extend our recent work on the money supply (Brunner and Meltzer, 1964c, 1966) to discuss the interaction of money supply, bank credit, and interest rates. The following section outlines a theory of the monetary process, more fully developed in the appendixes, and uses the theory to explain differences in the cyclical behavior of money and bank credit. We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions for most of the liquidity traps that have been mentioned in the literature and separate the traps into (1) those that are incompatible with the theory and must be rejected if the theory is correct and (2) those that depend on the sign or size of particular parameters. A discussion of some empirical findings and a conclusion complete the paper.
The Interaction of Money Supply, Bank Credit, and Interest Rates
Changes in the money supply and bank credit are used extensively as measures or indicators of the direction of monetary policy. Since money and bank credit often move in opposite directions or change at different rates, the two measures provide different information about the direction of policy. 6 Policy has been relatively more expansive during postwar recessions than during expansions when it is judged by changes in bank credit; it has been relatively more expansive during postwar periods of rising economic activity than during recessions when judged by changes in the stock of money. Although differences in the movements of money and bank credit appear to be systematic, no attempt has been made to link the two indicators in a theory of the money-supply process or to explain their divergent rates of change. This section outlines a framework that combines the banks' demand for earning assets (bank credit), the public's supply of earning assets to banks, the money supply, interest rates, and the monetary-policy variables. We use the theory to discuss a number of liquidity traps in the following section.
Three variables are used to summarize monetary policy: the weightedaverage reserve-requirement ratio, the rediscount rate, and the adjusted monetary base-currency plus reserves minus member-bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve.
7 Allocation decisions of the banks and the public in response to interest rates, policy, and other variables proximately determine the equilibrium stocks of money and bank credit. The framework suggests some reasons for the observed differences in the short-run movements of the money supply and bank credit artd in the information provided by some of the monetary variables that have been used frequently as indicators of the direction of monetary policy. Appendix II contains a more complete statement of the hypothesis and the underlying assumptions • a glossary of symbols is provided in Appendix I.
The Supply of Money and the Banks' Demand for Earning Assets'
Equations (1) and (2) express the quantity of money supplied (M, = K and K de ™ n A deP°SitS) and the l^tity of earning assets demanded by banks (£") as the product of the adjusted base (B<) and a multiplier, m, or a. The multipliers are assumed to depend on an index of interest rates (/.) representing yields on loans, government securities, and other earning assets included in the banks' portfolios; on the reserverequirement ratios (/•*); and on other entities discussed in Appendix II.
. ,)B\ ( 2 ) Policy variables affect money and bank credit in two distinct ways one direct, the other indirect. The direct effect of monetary policy is either (1) a change in the monetary ( OTl ) and earning-asset (a) multipliers resulting from a change in the reserve-requirement ratio or in the rediscount rate or the change m the base due to open-market operations. The indirect effect is the change m m, and in a induced by the change in interest rates that results from the change in policy (that is, from the open-market operation, the change in a reserve-requirement ratio, etc.).
Interest rates are assumed to change the monetary and asset multipliers through three relations expressing desired ratios. (1) The ratio of desired excess reserves to total deposits is assumed to depend on market interest rates and on the rediscount rate. (2) A similar dependence is assumed for the ratio of the desired volume of member-bank borrowing to total deposits. The excess-reserve and borrowing ratios have been combined in a single ratio, the desired-free-reserve ratio, denoted f. (3) The index of market interest rates, the interest rates paid by banks on time deposits, and other variables (see Appendix II) affect the public's allocation of deposits between time and demand accounts. The ratio of time to demand deposits t, summarizes this allocation. 
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rates results from their dependence on the /and t ratios and from the dependence of/and t on interest rates.
9
If policy operations, changes in interest rates, and changes in other components of the monetary and asset multipliers (see Appendix II) had an equal effect on both multipliers, the ratio of bank credit to money, denoted ft would be constant. The differences in the size and direction of changes in bank credit and money discussed above indicate, however, that the ratio p varies over time. Since equations (1) and (2) are multiplicative, they can be written in logarithmic form. After differentiation, differences in the rates of change of E and M x can be expressed as differences in the elasticities of the multipliers with respect to the variables on which the multipliers depend. The effect of interest rates and other factors 10 on the difference in the relative rates of change of M l and E is shown in equation (3), where e(a, i e ) and € (w ls i e ) are the elasticities of the multipliers with respect to interest rates and c(a, *) and € (m u x) are elasticities of the multipliers with respect to other entities on which the multipliers depend. (The multipliers are discussed more fully below.)
where / e ) -€ (m u i e ) = c(j8, /,). For the present, c(j8, Q is assumed to be positive. In the discussion of liquidity traps below, we will consider the implications of positive, negative, and zero values for this sum of elasticities.
Equilibrium on the Bank-Credit Market
Equilibrium on the market for bank credit requires that the volume of earning assets demanded by banks is matched by the volume of earning assets supplied to banks. The latter quantity (£ p ) is the nominal value of 9 The details of the/and / relations and assumptions about signs of derivatives are given in Appendix II, eqs. (A2) and (A5). The position of/and / in the monetary and asset multipliers is shown in eqs. (A6MA8), and the response of the multipliers to changes in /and / is given by eqs. (A9MA13). A more complete discussion of the effect of interest rates on the multipliers appears in the text of a later section and in n. 28 below.
10 Two problems that require further discussion are ignored at this point, (a) We will show below that the use of elasticities rather than derivatives has little if any bearing on the conclusions that we reach in this section or on the conclusions about liquidity traps in the following section. (b) Several variables on which the multipliers depend-the reserve-requirement ratios, the rediscount rate, etc.-are summarized by a variable or, in eq. (3) of the text an are discussed more fully at eq. (5) of the text below. The hypothesis in Appendix II implies that the elasticities of m x and a with respect to x are not uniformly proportional. Interest rates and some of the determmants included m * modify the comparative growth rates of bank credit and money loans obtained from banks and of the stock of government bonds sold to banks. In the process by which equilibrium is established; the outstanding stock of government securities is absorbed into the portfolios of the banks and the public; bank loans are extended or repaid; and interest rates are adjusted on bank loans, government securities, and other financial assets traded on the bank-credit market. A summary description of this process, encompassing a wide range of the public's financial behavior, is introduced as equation (4).
The sign of the derivative of the stock-supply functioh with respect to each of the arguments is stated below the equation. Nuiiibers are used to refer to the position of the variable in the equation. The symbols E p and i e have been introduced above. The other symbols are used to represent the index of transitory income, Y/Y p ; the real stock of non-human wealth, including the stock of government debt outstanding, WjP a \ a price index, p, of current output; the yield on real capital, ziy'and an index of rates on financial assets not traded on the bank-credit market, for example, corporate bonds, i 0 .
u From the bank-credit-market equations and the Hterket-equilibrium condition, E p = E b9 we can solve for i e and for the equilibrium stock of bank credit, £. These equilibrium values depend, of Course, on (1) the variables that enter the stock-supply equation, assumed to be predetermined relative to the bank-credit-market process; (2) the components of the earning-asset multiplier, a, such as the currency ratfo and the reserverequirement ratios; and (3) the adjusted monetary base. Once interest rates and the value of ft are determined, the money stock ft determined also.
Before proceeding to an algebraic statement of the solution on the bankcredit market and some implications of the hypothesis; *he discussion to this point is summarized in a diagram. We will, then, relax the assumptions about the signs of the elasticities of the E b , E p , and 0 functions with respect to interest rates and consider the conditions for a numberof liquidity traps. Figures 1 and 2 depict the simultaneous determination of the money supply (MO, a value of the index of interest rates (/,), and the stock of bank credit (£). The lines labeled E b and E p represent the banks' demand for earning assets, described by equation (2), and the public's supply of 11 Strictly speaking, the condition E p = E b requires that E p be defined as the supply of earning assets net of Treasury deposits and net worth. The dependence of E p on real wealth and prices separately should not suggest "money illusion" in the E p function. We have written the equation in the most general way, since the analysis in this paper does not require more detailed discussion of the equation or assumptions about the homogeneity of the function. The magnitude, but no the direction, of the change in ¿3 depends on the specific policy variable that is used to expand money and bank credit Al per «S change in induces a larger change in the E> curve and in / than a 1 per cent change m a reserve-requirement ratio
In Figure 2 This discussion of interest rates and of the observed changes in oolicv variables suggests that the use of changes in interest rates as f m asur of pretingThe £ °f ^ « preting the rise ,n interest rates as an indication of contractive policy the policy-maker ignores the procyclical movements of the policy varlbles'and hi £ result T " ^ t0 P°Hcy action ' -ther thai to he change m£ P resulting from variables (other than interest rates) in the E function The growth rate of the money supply corresponds Ire clotirto the growth rate of the policy variables than the growth rate of bank credit o changes in interest rates and more clearly reflects the procyclicai move ments of the policy variables. For this reason, the grow h ate ofthe" money supply ls a better indicator of policy operationsthan changest larger the response of the banks' free-reserve ratio to interest rates, the larger is t(a, i e ). And the larger e(o, /,) or the absolute value of <(s, i e ), the smaller the response in interest rates to variations in the base or any of the other variables. A preliminary conclusion about one type of liquidity trap can be drawn from a discussion of the elasticities in Table 1 by relaxing our previous assumptions about the slopes of the E v and E b functions. Suppose that in some period, i e was unaffected by monetary policy, that is, the denominator of c(/ e , B<) approached infinity, so that the effect of open-market operations or other policy changes on /, approached zero. In this case interest rates on the bank-credit market and other financial interest rates are unrelated, since e(/ e , Q must approach zero also. A significant positive correlation between yields (/,) on assets that banks traditionally buy (government bonds) and those that banks do not generally buy (corporate bonds) would be inconsistent with this type of liquidity trap under our hypothesis. In fact, the yields are positively correlated during the period in which the trap is most often said to have occurred, so the data support our hypothesis about the slopes of E, and E b and deny the existence of a traD of this kind.
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To analyze other liquidity traps that affect the supply and the demand functions for money or bank credit, we require a solution relating the money supply to interest rates and to the determinants of the equilibrium stock of bank credit. Equation (1) expressed the dependence of the money multiplier, m u on /,. If the solution for /, from equation (5) is substituted in equation (1), the money supply becomes dependent on the variables in the E p and E b equations. The solution for the money supply then expresses the interaction of the money supply, bank credit, and interest rates on the bank-credit market. It is the analytic foundation for the solution pictured on the right side of Figures 1 and 2. The equilibrium solution for the money supply plus time deposits, M a , is obtained in the same way. The procedure used to obtain these solutions is described more fully in Appendix III.
The elasticities of the monetary variables-M u M 2 , and E-with respect to each of the predetermined variables of the money-bank-credit process are derived from the solution equations. Some of these elasticities are shown in Table 2 . Each contains a factor q,(j = 1, 2, 3) defined at the The interpretation of the qi is discussed in the text below.
bottom of the table and obtained as a part of the solution pro«, just de cribed. The components of the " are interest elast.cmes of the monetae and asset multipliers and of the public's supply assets to banks. iSee Sec B of Appendix III for the derivation of the q t .)
A brief explanation will clarify the role of the q, If an open-market optrat on had no effect on interest rates, the monetary multipliers Z m and a) would be unaffected by open-market operations, he q, would be zero Ind the elasticity of each of the Monetary vanables 7m m and E) with respect to the base would be unity. Since opene^erationsXt interest rates and since the multipliers depend on interest rateT there is a feedback through interest rates to the monetary anT eTm Wp rs and to £,. Hence there is a feedback to M, A/ 2 , and £ If to* are between zero and one, the feedback reduces the response of the monetary variables to changes in the policy variables, and the elast.cties with respect to the base fall from 1 to 1 -J,At values of * = 1, changes in the base have no effect on money and bank credit.
The values of the therefore, have an important rotein.ur dof several types of liquidity traps. By assuming thatthe* -we can examine the implications of the type of liquidity trap under which monetary policy affects the stocks of money and bank credit (but not via interest rates); by assuming that all (or some) , vestigate the implications of a trap under which changes in the base attect i, but not the stocks of money and/or bank credit. 
The Conditions for Various Liquidity Traps
Although there is widespread agreement that monetary policy lost "effectiveness" in the thirties, substantial disagreement exists about the reason for the change. Some type of liquidity trap is often suggested as an explanation, but there is little agreement about the type of trap that is said to have occurred. Two main lines of argument are advanced: one asserts that a trap occurred in the demand for money; the second suggests that a trap operated within the banking system either because the banks desired to hold excess reserves and were unwilling to lend or because the public was unwilling to borrow. Agreement appears to be limited to the propositions that interest rates reached-or approached-a "floor" at which some interest elasticity became-or approached-zero or infinity and that monetary policy became powerless to restore full employment (see U.S. Congress, 1935; Klein, 1947; Tobin, 1947; Fellner, 1948; Villard, 1948; and Horwich, 1963) .
In this section we consider some of the traps that have been suggested. To analyze the many different statements about the effect of traps, we separate the traps into categories called "absolute" or "asymptotic," "complete" or "partial." If some elasticity is assumed to approach, but not reach, a critical value, the trap is called "asymptotic"; if the critical value is reached, the trap is "absolute." Traps for the money supply or bank credit are said to be "complete" if money or bank credit does not respond to any policy action. "Partial" traps occur if some policy actions become ineffective while others remain capable of inducing changes in the monetary variables. Various combinations are possible; for example, a complete or partial trap may be either absolute or asymptotic.
If the money supply and bank credit responded identically to changes in the policy variables, a trap for one of the monetary variables would, of course, imply a trap for the other. The equality of response of money and bank credit to policy operations is often described as a consequence of the balance sheet of the banking system. Money and credit are regarded as "two sides of a coin."
17 Yet our earlier analysis of the ratio of bank credit to money, showed that changes in policy and in predetermined variables induce changes in interest rates and in The analysis of this section shows that the equality of relative responses of bank credit and money to policy variables is a part of the necessary and sufficient conditions for some versions of the trap. A denial of the conditions required for equality of the relative responses of the monetary variables is often sufficient, therefore, to deny particular types of liquidity traps.
While the discussion cannot rule out or even consider all possible traps, it suggests strongly that a trap is most unlikely to occur if,our hypothesis is true. The truth of the hypothesis is assumed provisionally throughout this section, and all of the standard slope properties in Appendixes II and III are assumed to remain operative unless explicitly repealed. Empirical support for the theory is presented in a later section.
Absolute Traps for Interest Rates, Money, and Bank Credit
Necessary and sufficient conditions for six absolute liquidity traps are listed m Table 3 . Four of the traps are rejected because.they conflict with Table  4 and text Several sets of assumptions considered; some cases rejected; others depend on particular signs for parameters some part of the theory developed in the appendixes and discussed in the previous section. One cannot be rejected without empirical evidence. And one pair of partial traps (row 6) is in an intermediate position; some sets ol conditions that imply these.traps conflict with the theory; others require empirical evidence. After discussing the six absolute traps-, we will consider some asymptotic traps briefly. When discussing the elasticities in Table 1 , we showed that a trap for interest rates, proximately determined on the bank-credit market, cannot be absolute, since e(/" B«) cannot equal zero (Table 3 , row 1). TitS reason is that the elasticities of the E p and E b functions are not-infinite. 18 In principle, these elasticities may approach infinity and cause c(/ e , B a ) to approach zero. The data for the thirties, however, deny that this occurred, since the evidence suggests that interest rates on assets purchased-by banks remained correlated with interest rates on other financial assets, contrary to the implication of this trap.
The denial of a trap for interest rates on bank earning assets shows that some interest rate can always be reduced by expansive-policy action. Rejection of this trap denies that interest rates reached an absolute "floor" in the thirties, a conclusion that is common to most of the assertions that some type of trap existed. These conclusions do not depend on the choice of a particular interest rate or on the assumption of constant elasticities. The same conclusions are reached if the analysis is stated in terms of slopes: the derivative of i e with respect to B a cannot possibly be zero in a banking system that holds earning assets. 19 However, the fact that interest rates can always be reduced by expansive monetary policy does not establish that such policies must expand bank credit and the money supply. Row 2 of Table 3 shows a necessary and sufficient condition for a trap affecting all of the monetary variables, the complete monetary trap. If the monetary system is in this trap, the monetary authority can do nothing to increase or decrease the stocks of money and bank credit; M u M 2 , and iTdo not respond to any change in the policy variables. In principle, the complete monetary trap could occur if the decrease in i e resulting from an expansive policy induced banks to hold as excess reserves all of the increase in the adjusted base or in excess reserves brought about by the expansive policy. where a t and s t are partial derivatives of the banks' demand and the public's supply functions for earning assets with respect to i t and where a is the bank-credit multiplier. A necessary and sufficient condition for a zero value of / s a is a zero value for the bank-credit multiplier, a. This implies that banks hold earning assets in an amount no larger than their capital. Of course, the slope can approach zero if the denominator of i B * approaches infinity. But the conditions under which this would occur also make *(/«, -> 0, so little if any difference in the conclusion about the interest-rate trap results from the use of derivatives rather than elasticities.
20 This seems to have been the situation that Chairman Eccles had in mind when he testified that, even if currency was used to purchase government bonds from the public, there would be no increase in the money supply or in bank credit. "MR. CROSS: 'Why not pay off all government bonds and get rid of paying any interest-because that would be inflation itself?* "GOVERNOR ECCLES:
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the complete monetary trap imply that the responses of the monetary variables to changes in the policy variables are equal, since all the responses are zero. A subset of these conditions (q 1 = q 2 = q* and a = 1) makes the response of money and bank credit to changes in each of the variables in Table 2 equal, contrary to the argument of the previous section suggesting that the responses are unequal.
The conditions for the complete monetary trap and for the equality of the relative responses of the monetary variables to policy and other variables require that the monetary base equal zero. There is no other condition under which a, the ratio of MJE, equals unity. 21 The complete monetary trap involves a contradiction with one of the basic conditions for a monetary system and is, therefore, rejected. Monetary policy can always increase at least one of the monetary variables.
Since a cannot equal unity, the complete money-supply trap (row 3) and a similar trap for M 2 are rejected also. The denial of an'absolute trap for the money supply means that either an increase in the base or the lowering of a reserve-requirement ratio, or both, will increase the money supply. At worst, q x = 1 or q 1 = 1/a. Hence, one of three conclusions must be accepted (see Table 2 ): (1) The direct response of M x to*changes in B a is never completely offset by the effect of changes in interest rates, that is, q x < 1 ; (2) the response of M x to changes in the reserve-requirement ratios (and in the rediscount rate) is not completely offset by changes in interest rates, q x < 1/a; (3) or the money supply responds to ail policy variables. In short, a trap for the money supply can^ at most, be one of the partial traps discussed below. Here we note (1) that monetary policy never is reduced to a completely powerless act as suggested in thé metaphor about "pushing on strings" and (2) that our conclusions do not require any specific assumption about the level of interest rates or the size of policy operations.
We have now established that expansive monetary-policy always reduces some interest rate and expands the money supply. The conclusion can be extended to show that expansive policies always increase bank credit. A bank-credit trap is impossible, within our framework, if our earlier assumption about the slope of the E p function is maintained. Inspection of Table 2 indicates that the necessary and sufficient condition for We have shown elsewhere that the interest elasticity of the demand for money-estimated from any one of a number of alternative demand functions-did not become extremely large in the thirties. 23 This evidence suggests that a money-demand trap did not occur. However in the regression equations a particular interest rate was chosen to represent the influence of "interest rates" on the demand for money. It is important to show that the empirical findings hold quite generally and that they do not depend on the choice of a particular interest rate. To do so, the solution lor M u E, and /, on the bank-credit market is extended to include the determination of the quantity of money demanded (£>) and two interest rates, i e and i 0 . If both i e and i 0 are unaffected by monetary policy, or if the effect on the quantity of money demanded of changes in one index rate is exactly offset by changes in the other, then it is impossible for monetary policy to create any excess supply or demand for money; there is an absolute trap in the demand for money.
Simultaneous solutions of i e and i 0 are obtained from the credit-market (E p and E") and money (M, and D) equations. To simplify the presentation, the solutions for /, and l 0 have been combined in a weighted average 1 , with weights that depend on the interest elasticities of the demand for money. 24 The elasticities of i* with respect to monetary policy variables shown m Table 4 , are weighted averages of the elasticities of i e and L as shown at the bottom of the table. A necessary and sufficient condition for a money-demand trap is that /* is invariant with respect to changes in all monetary-policy variables 25 -*', r", etc.-as suggested in Table 3 , row 5. An absolute trap in the demand for money is impossible. This is shown by examination of the only conditions that we have found that make both *(/*, B a ) and c(/*, r d ) equal zero, namely, that q x = 1 = a and that either i 0 ) or c(D, i e ) equals zero while other components remain bounded. These conditions contain a contradiction, since we have shown previously that a cannot equal unity. Moreover, neither set of conditions implies that there is a "horizontal" portion, or trap, in the demand curve for money; the traps depend on an inability to increase the money supply by policy operations {q x = 1 = a) and a D or E p curve that is vertical with respect to one of the two interest rates. All other assumptions that make the numerator of the elasticities of i* equal zero make the denominators equal zero also, imply that the money-bank-credit process is indeterminate, and also make the demand function for money vertical. Since these implications have no economic meaning, the conditions that imply them can be safely disregarded. It follows that there is always some policy action that reduces /*.
Since interest rates can always be reduced and the money supply can always be increased, there cannot be an absolute liquidity trap in the demand for money. Someone must hold the increased supply of money at the lower interest rates, so the quantity of money demanded must increase. Again, none of these conclusions depends on the use of elasticities in the analysis. Similar results are obtained using derivatives.
Summary and Further Extension of the Theory
We have now shown that the theory of the money-bank-credit process precludes the possibility of absolute traps for interest rates and money. A trap for the stock of bank credit can occur if and only if the public is assumed to be totally insensitive to the level of interest rates whenRemanding and repaying loans or when selling government securities to banks.
But even if there is a bank-credit trap, monetary policy remains capable of creating an excess supply of money, lowering interest rates, and thereby inducing changes in output, employment, and prices.
However, we have not shown that open-market operations or other changes in B a have an expansive effect, only that thère is always some policy action that expands the money supply and lowers interest rates. Table 4 shows that, if q 1 = q 3 = 1 and if €(Z>, i 0 ) or €(s, i 0 ) is zero, the monetary system is in a partial trap, "the base trap." Changes in the base have no effect on the money supply, bank credit, or /*, and the monetary authority must then raise the reserve-requirement ratios or the rediscount rate to increase the money supply and lower /*. 26 Moreover, the analysis has concentrated on absolute traps. Assumptions that make the various elasticities approach, but not reach, zero or infinity have not been considered. These traps will be discussed briefly after we-have analyzed the conditions that imply a base trap.
The components of the interest elasticities of the monetary (mO and asset (a) multipliers are of particular importance for the discussion of the base trap and the asymptotic traps that follows. Thesè components were introduced earlier as part of the discussion of p. Interest rates were described there as operating on m x and a through the free-reserve (/) and time-deposit (t) ratios. Equations (6) and (7) below express the interest elasticities of m 1 and a as linear combinations of the interest elasticities of the / and t ratios weighted by the elasticities of the -monetary and asset multipliers with respect to / and r. Equations (A9)-(A12) of Appendix II indicate that the latter elasticities are the source of the difference in the interest elasticities of the monetary and asset multipliers.
The first combination of elasticities in equations (6) and (7) shows the effect of interest rates on m 1 and a through the free-rèserve ratio, / The partial derivative of/ with respect to / is negative by assumption, but the sign of the partial interest elasticity of the free-reserve ratio, e(/, /), depends on the sign of/. When the free-reserve ratio is positivé, *(/, /) is negative, and vice versa. But €(/, /) always appears multiplied by-the elasticity of the monetary or asset multiplier with respect to / These elasticities, *{m u f) and e(tf,/) also have signs that are opposites of the signs of/, so that the first product in the interest elasticities of the monetary and asset multipliers is always positive. 
26 The reason is that both €{M U r d ) in Table 3 and e(/*, r d ) in Table 4 change sign as a result of the assumptions in the text. This peculiar conclusion suggests that q x is always substantially less than unity and that there is never a base trap for the money supply. For convenience, we will hereafter omit the subscript on i unless it is required for clarity.
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JOURNAL OF.POLITICAL ECONOMY public's desired ratio of d^ the tlme -^Posit ratio. The on the interest rate paid on t me deoosiu ^^'' ' S assumed t0 depend assets,and on other variabTe i™*'' nteres^t es on alternative is assumed to affect the time dinn!;, ^ Table  1 open-market operations orl J " ** « «• * Since the denominators of q x and q 3 are identical, 9l q 3 if and only if «(«i, 0 = «a, i). A more useful statement of this equation is obtained by express,ng e ( a ,f) and e(a> ,) of equation (7) 
where A is the denominator of the monetary and asset multipliers and all other parameters have been introduced previously. Two alternative solutions satisfy equation (8). The first, « -1, is impossible if the monetary base is not zero. Only the set of conditions which make the bracketed expression equal zero requires investigation. Suitable transformation of equation (8) 1 s P°s itive -Since S//S/ is negative, the sum of the interest elast.ct.es of the t.me-deposit ratio must be negative also. Any other sign .s logically inconsistent with q x = q 3 under the hypothesis.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the equality of q, and q 3 are extremely difficult to satisfy. An empirical finding that the sum ofthe interest elast.cit.es of the time-deposit ratio is non-negative disposes of any base trap and ofthe equality of elasticities of money and bank credit with respect to the base. A finding that the sum ofthe interest elasticities ofthe r ratio ,snegat.ve does not assure that 9l = q 3 . More restrictive conditions are required, namely, that equation (9) is satisfied by the values of / / / etc To summarize, the joint base trap for money and bank credit c^n occur the sum of th ^ r 7 S arC met FirSt ' £(i ''> must be zero -Second, the sum of the interest elasticities of the time-deposit ratio must be 
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY negative. Third, both the derivative and the elasticities on the left of equation (9) must be bounded. If all these conditions are satisfied, the money supply is unaffected by open-market operations, and bank credit is unchanged by any policy action.
By changing one assumption, we can obtain the conditions under which there is a base trap for the money supply while bank credit responds, at least slightly, to all policy variables. Assume that i) is negative, so that q 3 is less than one. Then all of the other conditions above-, plus the assumption that ¿(m, i) = «-(a, /) -€(s, /), impose the base trap on the money supply only. A pair of values for / and t can then be found to satisfy an equation similar to (9) under the alternative assumption. The values of/ and t in this case will, of course, differ from those required for the joint base trap. But even if the modified equation (9) is satisfied, the money supply continues to respond to changes in the reserve-requirement ratios and in the rediscount rate.
It is logically possible-but very unlikely-that the stated conditions for the base traps are satisfied by the money-bank-credit relations. We noted earlier that i) = 0 (or approximately so) is a pecuter requirement for a trap, since it implies that the public is willing to borrow the same amount (or sell the same volume of securities to banks)-whatever the prevailing interest rates on the bank-credit market. This assumption is difficult to reconcile with the assumption that the public responds to interest rates, albeit negatively, in adjusting its desired ratio of time to demand deposits. Furthermore, the restriction imposed by the requirement that equation (9) must hold continuously makes the base traps very fragile. The problem is that an open-market operation raises-the excess-or freereserve ratio. As/rises, the ratio on the right of equation (9) falls. For the base traps to remain, the terms on the left of equation {9) must change also to maintain the approximate equality.
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The base traps do not imply that interest rates or the demand for money is trapped. Changes in all policy variables continue to affect i e (see Table 1 ), and changes in the reserve-requirement ratios or "the rediscount rate induce changes in the money supply, in /*, and in the ^quantity of money demanded. However, the responses of /* and M x to or p are reversed.
30 A continuous accumulation of excess reserves in the banking system would eventually break the base trap for the money supply, for bank credit, or for both. As / rises toward unity, rr' + f + v (see n. 29) becomes greater^than unity, and the interest elasticities of the monetary and asset multipliers become unequal. Of course, /cannot approach unity unless required-reserve ratios are reduced. But the reductions in required-reserve ratios expand the money supply, a point that is reaffirmed in the text just below.
It should be noted that a zero value for / does not satisfy eq. (9). If the denominator is zero, there is an indeterminacy; if the denominator is non-zero, / must equal 1. Excess reserves must be equal to total deposits» a condition that has never occurred. Note that a zero value of / means that all interest rates on all bank earning assets are zero.
To expand M x and lower /*, r d > i 4 , or p must be increased. But such actions raise i e and thus cause i* and i e to move in opposite directions, contrary to observations. These peculiar implications cast doubt on the likely occurrence of a base trap. Data for the thirties reinforce these doubts, since the increase in the reserve-requirement ratios lowered the money supply. Moreover, the time-deposit ratio rose during the thirties when interest rates rose and fell when interest rates fell, contrary to the assumption that the sum of the bracketed interest elasticities of the / ratio is negative. Data for other periods, for example, following the recent changes in Regulation Q, furnish additional evidence suggesting a positive value for the sum of these interest elasticities. Such observations constitute a prima facie case against the base trap. Consideration of more detailed evidence must await parameter estimates. Some are provided after a brief discussion of "asymptotic traps."
Asymptotic Traps
While the responses of the money supply or interest rates to monetary policy operations never become zero, it is often suggested that they may become so small that the monetary authority could acquire all financial assets without having a noticeable effect on output, employment, or prices. This problem is discussed by Patinkin (1965, pp. 349-54) . A review of the literature cited in previous sections suggests that many other writers failed to distinguish carefully between asymptotic traps and the absolute traps discussed earlier. It is important, therefore, to consider some cases in which various elasticities (or slopes) converge to zero or infinity and to show that some of the asymptotic traps are impossible while others require values of particular elasticities that are inconsistent with available evidence.
Many of the absolute traps were rejected because a-the ratio M 2 /Emust be greater than unity. Rising excess or free reserves raise a, so the accumulation of excess reserves by the banking system in the thirties does not negate the arguments used to reject the absolute traps and does not suggest that these traps hold in the limit. Moreover, equation (9) shows that a rising free-reserve ratio does not imply that open-market operations become ineffective. Additional assumptions must be made about S//S/, the sum of the interest elasticities of the time-deposit ratio and e(j, z e ). In short, the convergence of the interest elasticity of the free-reserve ratio to minus infinity and the accumulation of excess reserves by the banking system do not imply that thé money supply becomes independent of monetary policy. 31 31 Necessary and sufficient conditions for some asymptotic traps can be derived using eqs. (6) and (7). Two sets of assumptions make q 3 approach unity and q x approach 11 a so that there is a complete, asymptotic trap for bank credit and a trap for Mi for changes in the reserve-requirement ratios and the rediscount rate^6ividing Table   ' ) supply of money and th bLksTrn a n H f ' To obtain empirical estimates, the rates of interest on;commercial-bank loans and on corporate bonds were used to measure i t and / 0 , respectively, and the elasticities of the monetary and asset multipliers with respect to the reserve-requirement and currency ratios were assumed-to be constant. (Tables CI and C2 ).
The evidence generally supports our hypothesis about the signs of the elasticities of interest rates and money with respect to; policy and other variables and thus supports the analysis that led to the rejection of a number of liquidity traps. The residuals from the computed supply and demand equations for money furnish additional support. Large, systematic overestimates of the quantity of money suppliedin the late thirties, and large underestimates of the quantity demanded, would suggest that the banks and the public substantially increased the; quantities of reserves and money demanded relative to the amounts they would be expected to The assumption of constant elasticities for m and a with respect to r* r l and k is one of the simplest assumptions that can be made. It appears to. be quite reasonable for the post war years but is a somewhat poorer approximation for some of the prewar years that have been included in the data. The difficulties are particularly apparent in the early thirties, 1930-34, when there were substantial changes in the currency ratio For the postwar period, computation of the elasticities from monthly data for the period January, 1947-March, 1964, supports the assumption of constancy reasonablj well. A formal statement of our procedure is given in Appendix III, Sees. C.l and C 2 J tn nC i and Seltzer (1963, 1964c) and Meltzer (1963a). The sources of the data lor the supply and demand equations are given in these papers. hold at the prevailing levels of the policy variables, interest rates wealth, etc Table^ presents the data and shows that, although our equation overestimates the quantity of money supplied in the late thirt.es theoverestimate is not substantial. 34 Moreover, the overestimates of the nominal quantity demanded suggest that the public held a sl.ghtly smaller quantity of money than would be expected from their behavior in other penoA, ThU finding provides no support for the notion of a trap in the demand f°l n m S 6 we have listed the conditions for some of the liquidity'traps that cannot be rejected without estimates of particular parameters^The results in Appendix III, used to obtain the values shown in the table, ugg st that the parameter values required for these traps differ from the values suggested by our estimates. Most of the conditions listed were discussed in^fetail above, so the findings require only brief comment. A value of c a O > «(ffii.'«) is inconsistent with the first condition listed. To obtain' the Estimate of e{a, /<), we assume thatO approx.mately equds -<(s Q and use this value with the first sum shown m Our denials of the various liquidity traps do not .depend on particular assumpfons about the structure of the real sector. Any of a number of widely used models, ,n which expenditure functions are not completely interest inelastic and in which money wages adjust more slowly than the monetary var.ables, yield the conclusion that monetary policy affects the pace of economic activity once the liquidity trap is denied. Of course, each hypothesis has different properties that may imply differences in the magnitude of the response to monetary policy. But our conclusion that monetary policy has an effect on the real variables does not appear to be sensitive to changes in the hypotheses about the real sector Part of this conclusion is not novel. Most economist* agree that openmarket operations change prevailing interest rates, alter the relative prices of assets and output, and hence affect real variables. Denial of the liquidity trap, however adds important support to the generality of this conclusion and suggests that the ability of monetary authority to introduce or remove an excess demand for real balances does not depend on the real-balance funlLt f CC u 2 liqUidity trap in both the su PP'y and demand functions for money, there is little reason to believe that the effectiveness of monetary policy ever requires the assumption that the government r/T un k c , 0ncerned * the cha "S e in the value of its outstanding debt or that the public is unconcerned about changes in future tax burdens 
